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Abstract
Users’ perceptions of risks have important implications for information security, as the
actions of individual users can compromise entire systems. Therefore, there is a critical
need to understand how users perceive and respond to information security risks.
Previous research on perceptions of information security risk has chiefly relied on selfreported measures. Although these studies are valuable, risk perceptions are often
associated with feelings—such as fear or doubt—that are difficult to measure accurately
using survey instruments. Additionally, it is unclear how these self-reported measures
map to actual security behavior.
This paper contributes by demonstrating that risk-taking behavior is effectively predicted
using electroencephalography (EEG) via event-related potentials (ERPs). Using the
Iowa Gambling Task, a widely used technique shown to be correlated with real-world
risky behaviors, we show that the differences in neural responses to positive and
negative feedback strongly predict users’ information security behavior in a separate
laboratory-based computing task.
In addition, we compare the predictive validity of EEG measures to that of self-reported
measures of information security risk perceptions. Our experiments show that selfreported measures are ineffective in predicting security behaviors under a condition in
which information security is not salient. However, we show that, when security concerns
become salient, self-reported measures do predict security behavior. Interestingly, EEG
measures significantly predict behavior in both salient and non-salient conditions,
indicating that EEG measures are a robust predictor of security behavior.
Keywords: Risk Perception, Information Security Behavior, NeuroIS, Self-reported
Measures, EEG, Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Laboratory Experiment, Security Warning
Disregard.
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Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that individual users play a crucial role in the security of
information systems (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). This is
because users often represent the weakest link in the security of a system—if a user can
be coaxed into doing something insecure, the security of an entire system can be
compromised (Anderson, 2008). The status of users as the weakest link in the security
chain is fully recognized by hackers and cybercriminals, who routinely use social
engineering tactics to trick users into installing malicious software (malware) or
otherwise obviate technical security controls (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010;
Mandiant, 2013). Given this reality, it is of primary importance to understand how users
perceive and respond to information security risks.
Behavioral research on information systems security to date has mainly used selfreported measures to gauge users’ perceptions of information security risks (e.g.,
Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010; Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004). While studies using self-reported
measures have contributed significantly to our theoretical understanding of security and
behavior, such measures are prone to a number of biases that can undermine the
validity of scientific findings (Dimoka et al., 2012). In particular, many emotions, such as
fear, uncertainty, and distrust (all intrinsic to risk perceptions), are at least partially
experienced unconsciously, which makes them difficult to capture accurately (Dimoka,
Pavlou, & Davis, 2011; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004).
Moreover, users’ perceptions of risks have predominantly been associated with
intentions to behave rather than behavior itself (Crossler et al., 2013). This is
problematic in the context of information security because respondents have been
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shown to profess security concerns and later fail to take action to protect themselves
online, even when the costs to do so are minimal (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2004). Due to
these concerns, researchers have called for the measurement of security-related
cognition and behaviors using alternative means, such as NeuroIS methods (Crossler et
al., 2013). Therefore, a gap exists in our understanding of (1) how to measure
information security risk perceptions most accurately and (2) how these measures map
to security behavior.
This paper contributes by demonstrating that risk perceptions are effectively measured
using electroencephalography (EEG) via event-related potentials (ERPs), which
measure neural events triggered by specific stimuli or actions. To do so, we measured
ERPs in response to gains and losses in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a widely used
technique in the fields of psychology and neuroscience that has been shown to be
strongly correlated with real-world risky behaviors (Buelow & Suhr, 2009). Further, we
show that the differences in these measures of the neural responses to gains and losses
strongly predict users’ information security behavior in a separate laboratory-based
computing task.
In addition, we compare the predictive power of EEG measures to that of self-reported
measures of information security risk perceptions. Our experiments show that these selfreported measures of risk perception are ineffective in predicting security behaviors
under a condition in which information security is not salient. However, we show that,
when security concerns become salient (through a simulated malware incident on
participants’ personal computers), these same self-reported measures of security risk
perception do predict security behavior. Interestingly, EEG measures significantly predict
behavior in both salient and non-salient conditions, indicating that EEG measures are a
robust predictor of security behavior.
3

This paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature to show how perceived
information security risk has been previously captured using self-reported measures as
well as neural measures. Second, we develop our hypotheses for the predictive validity
of self-reported and EEG measures of risk and under what conditions they are most
effective. Third, we describe our methodology involving a series of surveys and
experimental tasks. Fourth, we present our analysis and the results of our hypothesis
testing. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings, their limitations, and
directions for future research on the use of NeuroIS methods to measure the construct of
information security risk perceptions.

Literature Review
Background
In this section, we set a foundation for our hypotheses and experimental task by
reviewing how information security risk perceptions have previously been studied in the
IS field. We also discuss methodological issues for capturing risk perceptions using selfreported and NeuroIS methods.

Information Security Risk Perceptions
Risk perception is an interesting area of study because it is a complex combination of
social, cultural, economic, psychological, financial, and political factors (e.g., Brooker,
1984; Dholakia, 2001; Grewal, Gotlieb, & Marmorstein, 1994; Kaplan, Szybillo, &
Jacoby, 1974; Slovic, 1987). IS researchers have examined risk perceptions in the
domains of information security and privacy (e.g., Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Guo et al.,
2011; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Malhotra et al., 2004). A primary theoretical
perspective used is Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and related health-belief models
(Rogers, 1975). PMT explains how people become motivated to cope with a threat, with
4

two principal drivers being perceived severity and perceived susceptibility. Perceived
susceptibility refers to the likelihood of becoming exposed to a threat, whereas perceived
severity is the impact of potential consequences posed by the threat (Prentice-Dunn &
Rogers, 1986). Together, these two constructs essentially measure perceived risk.
Researchers have used PMT to explain the adoption of anti-spyware software (Johnston
& Warkentin, 2010), information security policy (ISP) compliance (Herath & Rao, 2009;
Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012), and secure behaviors of employees (Workman,
Bommer, & Straub, 2008) and home users (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Liang and Xue
(2010) used the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), which draws on PMT as
its theoretical base to explain how threat severity and susceptibility contribute to the
avoidance of spyware threats.
Privacy researchers have also used the construct of perceived risk (Hong & Thong,
2013; Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & Saarinen, 1999; Xu, Luo, Carroll, & Rosson, 2011). In
these studies, perceived risk is used to explain Internet users’ willingness to share
information about themselves online. Although these studies do not measure threat
severity and threat susceptibility separately, they are both implicit in the measurement
items (see Dinev & Hart, 2006; Malhotra et al., 2004 for commonly used measures of
privacy perceived risk). In such cases, perceived risk is measured in terms of the
likelihood of a negative privacy outcome (such as a company selling one’s personal
information).

Self-reported Measures
In all of the studies mentioned above, perceptions of risk were measured with selfreported measures. The advantages of such measures are that they are fairly easy to
develop, distribute, collect, and analyze. A straightforward means of measuring
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someone’s perceptions is simply to ask that person. However, self-reported measures
are subject to a range of well-known biases and demand effects (Dimoka et al., 2011),
including the social desirability bias, subjectivity bias, common methods bias, and
demand bias. Social desirability bias is the tendency of individuals to portray themselves
and their behavior in ways that are more socially acceptable. It includes exaggerated
positive self-reports and diminished or non-disclosure of negative self-reports (Paulhus,
1991). Subjectivity bias refers to the difficulty of capturing reality by soliciting individuals'
subjective perceptions. Individual differences between respondents can distort measures
of objective reality (Theorell & Hasselhorn, 2005). Common methods bias describes
variance that is attributable to artifacts of the survey instrumentation rather than to actual
variance between different constructs (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).
Demand bias relates to the effects of the roles that participants may perceive as part of
the tacit social contract formed between participants and the experimenters in
undertaking a study. Demand-induced behaviors include attempting to discern and
intentionally confirm or disconfirm the experimenter’s hypotheses (Orne & Whitehouse,
2000).
Additionally, self-reported measures require conscious decision-making. Several studies
in psychology (e.g. Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Skowronski & Lawrence, 2001; Spangler,
1992) have shown that self-reported measures may correlate poorly with more implicit
measures where participants may or may not be unaware in control of the impact of their
attitude and cognition (Fazio & Olson, 2003). These types of non-conscious reactions
are inherently impossible to self-report.
Further, in almost all of the previous studies that measured perceived risk, intentions,
rather than actual behavior, were measured as the dependent variable (Workman et al.,
2008 is an exception). This is problematic, as studies of IS security and privacy have
6

shown that people behave inconsistently with their self-reported concern for their privacy
and security (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2004; Belanger, Hiller, & Smith, 2002; Norberg,
Horne, & Horne, 2007). For these reasons, our understanding of perceived risks and
their effect on security behavior may be incomplete.

Neurophysiological Measures
A promising approach to investigate the effectiveness of security warnings is cognitive
neuroscience applied to information systems (NeuroIS). In particular, the neural bases
for human cognitive processes can offer new insights into the complex interaction
between information processing and decision-making. D'Arcy and Herath (2011, p. 694)
presented a call for research that applies NeuroIS to human-computer interaction, which
includes “inferring temporal ordering among brain areas” as an important area of inquiry.
They explain that, to understand the design of IT artifacts better, it is desirable to study
the timing of brain activations while completing decision tasks. It has been suggested
that NeuroIS techniques are a particularly promising means of measuring information
security-related behaviors and attitudes (Crossler et al., 2013).

EEG Measures
The neurophysiological measure we use in this study is the P300 component of an
event-related potential (ERP) measured with electroencephalography (EEG). The P300
is a positive-going component that peaks between 250 and 500 milliseconds after
stimulus onset and has been observed in tasks that require stimulus discrimination
(Polich, 2007). Passive stimulus processing generally produces smaller P300 amplitudes
than active tasks; when task conditions are undemanding, the P300 amplitude is
smaller. It has been proposed that the P300 reflects processes related to updating the
mental representations of the task structure (Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles, 1988).
According to the context-updating theory, incoming stimuli are compared against
7

previous stimuli held in working memory. If the new stimulus matches previous stimuli,
no updating is required and no P300 is generated. If, however, the new stimulus
produces a mismatch with the stimuli held in working memory, the context for that
stimulus is updated and a P300 is generated. It is thought that, since infrequent, lowprobability stimuli can be biologically important, it is adaptive to inhibit unrelated activity
to promote processing efficiency, thereby yielding large P300 amplitudes (Polich, 2007).
EEG has been used in the psychology and neuroscience literature to study risk-taking
tendencies in individuals. Many EEG studies on risk-taking have had participants
perform a gambling task while measuring the EEG either before or during the task.
Some studies have related self-reported survey responses on risk-taking propensities to
different EEG measurements, including ERP amplitudes and latencies, the power in
different frequency bands of the EEG (Massar, Rossi, Schutter, & Kenemans, 2012), or
resting-state EEG measurements (Massar, Kenemans, & Schutter, 2013). A group of
studies have focused on ERPs for predictions of risk-taking behaviors during gambling
or other card tasks. These studies looked at various ERP components under conditions
when participants experience a negative (loss) event or a positive (reward) event.

Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we lay out our theory and associated hypotheses. Before doing so,
however, we define the specific type of security behavior we examine in this paper—
security warning disregard.

Security Warning Disregard
A common defense against security threats is a security warning presented to the user
by the operating system and software, such as email clients and Web browsers (Yee,
2004). While technically effective, these security warnings are undermined by users who
8

either willfully disregard them or fail to recognize the importance of the threat (Schneier,
2004). This commonly observed behavior is contained in a well-known epigram in
information security: “given a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick
dancing pigs every time” (McGraw & Felten, 1999, p. 29). This means that, given a Web
link promising to show some amusing entertainment on one hand and a security warning
for the same link on the other, users will often ignore the security warning and access
the Web link anyway.
We formally define this behavior as security warning disregard. We chose this particular
form of security behavior as the dependent variable for the study because, by heeding or
disregarding a security warning, users explicitly accept or reject taking on added risk to
their information security. Consequently, this behavior provides an observable indication
of a user’s information security risk tolerance, which can then be directly compared to
measures of perceived risk.

The Effect of Security Incidents on Behavior and Risk Perception
For fear-arousing stimuli intended to cause individuals to perceive a threat and then take
a certain action to avert that threat to be effective, both the threat severity and the threat
susceptibility should be conveyed (Rogers, 1975). The concept of a threat in a feararousing stimulus is theoretically analogous to the concept of risk—a threat is an event
with a potentially adverse consequence (Witte, 1992), and a risk describes an event with
a potentially negative consequence.
However, computer users are susceptible to becoming desensitized to fear-arousing
stimuli and warning messages in general. Studies on warning communications and
information system security have empirically validated that users can become habituated
to seeing a warning message. For example, Egelman, Cranor, and Hong (2008)
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demonstrate habituation to Web browser phishing warning messages that appear
visually similar after repeated exposure to the warning. Similarly, Amer and Maris (2007)
used a laboratory experiment with more general or generic system warning messages
that also demonstrated warning message habituation. We theorize that technology users
who are already habituated to security warning messages will perceive low risk when
presented with the messages since habituation can cause the warning not even to rise
to the attention level of an individual (Amer & Maris, 2007) and because it is likely that
the warning never resulted in a negative consequence (also described as the warning
"crying wolf" by Sunshine, Egelman, Almuhimedi, Atri, and Cranor (2009)).
We further predict that, after suffering a security incident (a fear-arousing stimulus) in
relation to a threat, the security warning message warned against, such as having one's
computer become infected with computer malware, an individual's perceived threat
susceptibility will become higher than before the security incident, which will increase
self-reported measures of risk perception. Good, Dhamija, Muligan, and Konstan (2005)
found that users who had a recent past negative experience in their computer usage
were more cautious compared with other users. We also predict, consistent with the
findings of Johnston and Warkentin (2010), a decrease in intended risk-taking behavior.
In line with this logic, we provide the following hypotheses:
H1: Security warning disregard before a security incident will be higher than security
warning disregard after a security incident screen.
H2: Pre-test self-reported measures of risk perception will be lower before a security
incident than post-test self-reported measures of risk perception after a security incident.

Effectiveness of Self-reported Measures
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The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) posits that an individual's beliefs
and intentions correlate with their actual behavior associated with those beliefs and
intentions. Since raising perceptions of risk or a threat is an integral goal of a feararousing stimulus and since a security warning message can be considered feararousing, we posit that self-reported measures of risk perception will predict security
warning disregard.
However, the pre-test self-reports will likely be confounded by the effects of habituation
to seeing security warning screens regularly (Amer & Maris, 2007). Consequently, while
some users may report high levels of perceived risk in general, they may act contrarily in
their actual behavior. Thus, pre-test risk perception measurements would not be as
strong a predictor for actual security warning disregard before a security incident
compared with parallel post-test measurements after a security incident since the
exposure to the security incident will likely break the habituation and desensitization to
the security warning messages (see Bansal, Zahedi, & Gefen, 2010; Good et al., 2005;
Ng & Feng, 2006). Therefore, we provide the following hypotheses:
H3: Pre-test self-reported measures of risk perception will negatively predict security
warning disregard before a security incident is imposed.
H4: Post-test self-reported measures of risk perception will negatively predict security
warning disregard after a security incident is received better than will pre-test selfreported measures of risk perception before a security incident is imposed.

Effectiveness of EEG Measures
Prior studies in the neuroscience literature have reported that amplitude measurements
of the P300 component of the ERP during risk-taking laboratory experiment tasks can
correlate with participants’ risk-taking behavior during the experiment (Polezzi, Sartori,
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Rumiati, Vidotto, & Daum, 2010; Schuermann, Endrass, & Kathmann, 2012; Yeung &
Sanfey, 2004). The P300 amplitude can vary depending on such factors as the valence
of an outcome (i.e., whether it is a gain or loss), how frequent target stimuli are
compared to non-targets, the magnitude of the gain or loss, and the personal motivation
to do well (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004).
The P300 has been implicated in context updating (c.f. Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles,
1988). According to the context-updating theory, the P300 reflects the amount of
cognitive resources allocated to re-evaluating an internal model of the environment. In a
task such as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), the internal model has to do with the
probability of a reward when selecting cards from certain decks. In the case of the lowfrequency, high-magnitude penalty (referred to as the B Penalty; see the task description
below), a large updating is necessary, as the deck has been a big winner for a number
of trials but now becomes a big loser. This interpretation is supported by recent findings
by San Martín, Appelbaum, Pearson, Huettel, and Woldorff (2013), who showed that the
magnitude of the P300 predicted individual choices in a gain maximization/loss
minimization task similar to the IGT.
We posit that the P300 will predict security warning disregard better after a security
incident than it will before a security incident. While P300 amplitude measurements can
still measure how individuals will respond in risk-taking situations, if the users are
habituated to a particular security warning screen, they are less likely to register it as a
threat until they are sensitized by a significant change, such as a security incident (Amer
& Maris, 2007). After experiencing the security incident, individuals' P300 measurements
will better predict their “unhabituated” security warning disregard. Given these
arguments, we provide the following hypotheses:
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H5: Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security warning disregard
before a security incident is imposed.
H6: Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security warning disregard
after a security incident is imposed better than will the same P300 amplitude measures
before a security incident is imposed.

Advantages of Neurological Measures vis-à-vis Self-reported Measures for
Risk Perceptions
While self-reported measurements have been theorized to be able to predict actual
behavior to a certain degree (see TPB, Ajzen, 1991), these measurements are subject to
several weaknesses that decrease their explanatory power, including common methods
bias, social desirability, and subjectivity bias (Dimoka et al., 2011). Moreover, constructs
such as risk perceptions can be difficult to capture with self-reported measures, given
that they can be non-conscious and may never rise to the surface of realization for
individuals, and individuals naturally cannot self-report things about themselves of which
they are not cognizant (Dimoka, 2010; LeDoux, 2003). Direct neural measurement
methodologies,

such as

EEG,

overcome these

weaknesses

of

self-reported

measurements since they measure without the participants’ involvement (Dimoka et al.,
2011). Therefore, we predict that EEG measurements (specifically the P300 component
of the ERP) will predict security warning disregard better than both pre-test and post-test
self-reported measurements. In line with this, we hypothesize the following:
H7: Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security warning disregard
better than pre-test self-reported measures of risk perception before a security incident
is imposed.
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H8: Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security warning disregard
better than will post-test self-reported measures of risk perception after a security
incident is imposed.

Methodology
We used a laboratory experiment to test the hypotheses. The experimental design
consisted of four stages: a pre-test survey; a risk-taking experiment called the Iowa
Gambling Task, during which EEG was recorded; a separate image classification
computing task with simulated security warnings; and a post-test survey. Each of these
stages is explained in turn below.

Pre-test Survey
Prior to taking part in the experiment, the participants were required to complete a pretest survey to gauge their general risk propensity and information security risk
perceptions of malware. To measure general risk propensity, we used general risk
orientation (Kam & Simas, 2010) and willingness to gamble lifetime income (Barsky,
Juster, Kimball, & Shapiro, 1997) for income risk. These questions enabled us to create
a general risk profile for each subject. We also used two different measures of IS
security risk perception to ensure that (1) our measures were representative of IS risk
perception measures used in the literature and (2) our results would not depend on any
one measure. The measures selected were those of Johnston and Warkentin (2010),
who measured risk perceptions using separate items for threat severity and threat
susceptibility; and Guo et al. (2011), who measured security risk perception as a single
construct. Please see Appendix B for information about how these measures were
selected.
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The pre-test survey contained 16 items measuring general and information securityrelated risk. To minimize hypothesis guessing in the experimental task, participants were
required to take the pre-test survey online one week prior to the experiment. Because
the survey was online it could be taken by many students at once. However, the other
phases of the experiment were scheduled at one hour each, with limitations based on
laboratory and researcher availability. Consequently, some students who took the initial
survey very early were not able to do the second stage of the experiment until up to four
weeks later. To further obscure the objective of the pre-test survey, we added 17
unrelated personality questions to the survey as well as eight demographic questions. In
total, the pre-test survey consisted of 44 questions, which are reported in the appendix.

Iowa Gambling Task
The first experiment consisted of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a widely used
technique in the fields of psychology and neuroscience to measure the decision-making
ability of individuals (Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010). The IGT was
originally designed by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994) at the
University of Iowa as an instrument to measure risk-taking behaviors by simulating reallife decision-making. The task is a gambling card game in which participants are
required to choose cards from four decks for a set number of rounds. Each card draw
results in participants earning a varying amount of play money, but some cards also
include penalties that lose money. Certain decks are safer in that they contain smaller
rewards, but the losses are also smaller, resulting in overall net gains. In contrast, riskier
decks contain larger rewards, but the losses are also larger, resulting in overall net
losses. Within both the safe and risky decks, the frequency of losses is varied such that
some decks have frequent, smaller losses while other decks have infrequent, larger
losses (see Table 1 below). The participants’ task is to learn by experience which decks
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are safest, that is, those that yield the most money in the long run. Participants are said
to be risk seeking if, after all rounds have been completed, they have lost more money
than they have earned (Weller, Levin, & Bechara, 2010).
Of particular interest to our study, the IGT has been shown to be predictive of risk
behaviors outside of the experimental task (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011). For
example, poor performance on the IGT is strongly correlated with real-world risky
behaviors such as substance abuse, compulsive gambling, and criminality (Buelow &
Suhr, 2009), as well as medication non-compliance (Stewart, Acevedo, & Ownby, 2012).
Additionally, IGT performance has been found to be strongly associated with sensationseeking (Crone, Vendel, & van der Molen, 2003), disinhibition (van Honk, Hermans,
Putman, Montagne, & Schutter, 2002), reward responsiveness and fun-seeking (Suhr &
Tsanadis, 2007), and impulsivity (Buelow & Suhr, 2013). Given the predictive power of
the IGT for real-world risky tasks, we similarly expect the IGT to be predictive of insecure
computing behaviors.
Within the field of neuroscience, various indexes have been used as measurements for
risk-taking behavior during the IGT. Besides a simple ratio of risky to non-risky deck
choices (Bechara et al., 1994), neurophysiological methods have been used, such as
skin conductance responses (SCR) (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005; Maia
& McClelland, 2004; van Honk et al., 2002), cortisol measurements to correlate a lack of
fear with higher risk-taking propensities (van Honk, Schutter, Hermans, & Putman,
2003), positron emission technology (PET), which measures normalized cerebral blood
flow (rCBF) (Bolla et al., 2003; Ernst et al., 2002), and fMRI (Fukui, Murai, Fukuyama,
Hayashi, & Hanakawa, 2005; Singh & Sungkarat, 2008; Tanabe et al., 2007), which also
uses blood flow measures to track neural activity. In particular, EEG is a popular method
of measuring the neural correlates of risk-taking behavior in the IGT (Oberg, Christie, &
16

Tata, 2011; Schutter & Van Honk, 2005). Recent research has demonstrated that the
P300 is sensitive to loss minimization, with larger amplitudes for larger than for smaller
losses (San Martín et al., 2013). Furthermore, San Martín et al. demonstrated that the
P300 amplitude predicted subsequent behavioral adjustment within individual subjects.
Likewise, we measured P300 amplitudes during the IGT in this study.

IGT Procedures
The stimuli consisted of the four virtual decks of cards displayed on a computer monitor
in an electrically shielded testing room. Participants entered each deck selection using
the keyboard. Upon making a choice, the participant received feedback such as, “You
won 50” or “You won 100 but lost 50” after a 750 ms delay. This delay was used to
separate the electrical activity of the motor act of pressing the keyboard button from the
ERP response to the feedback message. We implemented the same reward/penalty
schedule as the original IGT described by Bechara et al. (1994) over 100 trials (see
Table 1). However, we modified the original IGT design to include four rounds of 100
trials per round (400 trials total). This was done to make the task more suitable for ERP
measurement (Christie & Tata, 2009). The position of the four decks was randomized at
the start of each round to require participants to rediscover which decks were most
profitable. Win and loss subtotals were displayed in between each round. The decks
were shuffled at the start of each round. Finally, participants were instructed that they
would be eligible to receive a bonus extra credit point if they finished the IGT with a
positive balance.
Table 1. IGT Deck Details
Deck

Gains

Losses

Frequency

A
B
C
D

Large (+100)
Large (+100)
Small (+50)
Small (+50)

-150, -200, -250, -300, -350
-1,250
-25, -50, -75
-250

Frequent
Infrequent
Frequent
Infrequent

Net Gain/Loss
over 10 Trials
(-250)
(-250)
+250
+250

Rank of
Riskiness
2
1
4
3
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Electrophysiological Data Recording and Processing
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 128 scalp sites using a HydroCel
Geodesic Sensor Net and an Electrical Geodesics Inc. (EGI; Eugene, Oregon, USA)
amplification system (amplification 20K, nominal bandpass 0.10–100Hz). The EEG was
referenced to the vertex electrode and digitized at 250 Hz. Impedances were maintained
below 50 kΩ. EEG data were processed off-line beginning with a 0.1 Hz first-order
highpass filter and a 30 Hz lowpass filter. Stimulus-locked ERP averages were derived
spanning 200 ms pre-stimulus to 1,000 ms post-stimulus and segmented based on the
following trial type criteria: risky deck (decks A and B) rewards; safe deck (decks C and
D) rewards; deck A penalty; deck B penalty; deck C penalty; and deck D penalty. Eye
blinks were removed from the segmented waveforms using independent components
analysis (ICA) in the ERP principal components analysis (PCA) toolkit (Dien, 2010) for
Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA). The ICA components that correlated at 0.9 with the
scalp topography of a blink template were removed from the data (Dien, Michelson, &
Franklin, 2010). Artifacts in the EEG data due to saccades and motion were removed
from the segmented waveforms using PCA in the ERP PCA toolkit (Dien, 2010).
Channels were marked as bad if the fast average amplitude exceeded 100 μV or if the
differential average amplitude exceeded 50 μV. Because the structure of the IGT results
in fewer trials in some conditions than in others, there is a possibility that ERP results
could be biased by unequal trial counts in the conditions of interest due to the lower
signal to noise ratio associated with fewer trials (Clayson, Baldwin, & Larson, 2013). To
counter this, we randomly chose a subset of trials from the conditions with more trials to
match the number of good trials following artifact correction in the condition with the
lowest trial count (the deck B penalty in almost every case). Data from three participants
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(one female, two males) were excluded from ERP analyses due to low trial counts or
excess bad channels. Data from the remaining participants were average re-referenced
and waveforms were baseline corrected using a 200 ms window prior to feedback
stimulus presentation. The participants spent about 15 minutes on the IGT task, after
which the EEG cap was removed.

Image Classification Task
After the completion of the IGT, participants were taken into another testing room to
perform an online image classification task. The purpose of this task was to observe how
participants responded to security warnings when doing work under time pressure, thus
simulating real-world working conditions. However, this purpose was concealed from the
participants, who were led to believe that classifying online images was the sole purpose
of the task. In doing so, we followed a deception protocol approved by the university’s
Institutional Review Board.
Our goal in this study was to determine the effectiveness of the self-reported risk
perception measures and the IGT measure to predict risky security behavior—
specifically, security warning disregard. For this reason, it was critical that participants
perceived actual risk to their data when performing the task. Accordingly, we required
participants to bring their personal laptops to the experiment to use during the image
classification task. In a few instances, participants failed to bring a laptop, in which case
they were provided with a laptop that belonged to one of the researchers. Debriefing
interviews with participants subsequent to the task uniformly confirmed that participants
perceived higher risk due to using their (or the researcher’s) personal laptop rather than
a laboratory machine.

Image Classification Task Procedure
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Participants used their laptops to browse to a URL for the image classification task and
signed in using a participant number. They were left alone in the room to complete the
task. Participants read instructions stating that their task was to classify images of
Batman on the Web as either animated or photographic versions of the character. The
ostensible purpose for doing so was to compare a computer algorithm’s performance in
the classification task to that of a human.
During the task, the experimental website displayed within an HTML frame websites
found through a Google Image search for “Batman” (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1. The image classification experimental website.

For each website, participants were required to click a button labeled “Real” or
“Animated” to classify the images. Additionally, participants were under time pressure to
complete the task. For each website, participants had ten seconds in which to classify
the image. Failure to classify the image was counted as an incorrect answer.
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A performance bar in the bottom-left corner of the screen provided participants with live
feedback on their performance. Initially, the bar was green, and it remained so as long
as participants classified images correctly. A green bar communicated to participants
that they were on track to receive a bonus extra credit point given as an incentive.
However, if the bar turned red due to a misclassification, participants knew that they
were no longer eligible for the bonus extra credit point. This design was chosen because
loss aversion research (c.f. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) indicates that people are more
passionate about not losing something relative to the possibility of gaining something.
The penalty for failing to classify an image correctly was a 40-percent reduction of the
performance bar. However, each correct classification increased the performance bar by
10 percent (if not already full). At the 90-pecent level, the bar became green again, thus
building forgiveness into the task so that participants could recover with good
performance.
Unbeknownst to the participants, the experimental website was programed to
periodically display Web browser security warnings (see Figure 2). The security warning
was modeled after the one used in the Google Chrome Web browser. As such,
participants had the option to click on the security warning, choosing either “No, don’t
proceed” or “Yes, proceed anyway.”
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Figure 2. The security warning screen.
If the participants clicked “no,” the Web frame redirected to Google.com, and they were
penalized for failing to classify the image correctly. If participants clicked “yes,” they were
taken to the Google Image search result and allowed to classify the image. If participants
failed to take action within ten seconds, the experimental website displayed the next
Google Image search result and penalized participants for failing to classify the image.
Thus, participants were under pressure to work quickly and perform well on the task.
Heeding the security warning therefore came at a cost of productivity, simulating the
real-world costs of observing security warnings (Herley, 2009).
The configuration for the algorithm's penalty mechanism was as follows: the
performance bar had a range from zero to 100 and an initial value of 100. If the bar
dropped below a predetermined 90-point threshold, the bar would turn red. The penalty
for a failed classification was 40 points. If the performance bar was not already full, the
reward for a correct answer was 10 points.
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In addition to examining how participants would respond to security warnings initially, we
also wished to observe whether a security incident could raise perceptions of information
security risk and change behavior (H2, H4, H6, H8). Therefore, we imposed a simulated
security incident without warning midway through the image classification task. The
security incident consisted of a message from an “Algerian hacker” that displayed a tensecond countdown timer and the words “Say goodbye to your computer” (Figure 3).

Figure 3. The simulated security incident hacker screen.

The message was displayed full-screen to maximize impact and was modeled after
actual website defacements archived on Zone-H.org. Participants reported a relatively
high degree of concern as a result of the hacker screen (an average of 7.5 on a scale of
0—“not concerned at all”—to 10—“100% concerned”)—a result that was significantly
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higher than the neutral response of 5 (one-sample t-test, t = 3.752, p < .001).
Additionally, this finding was corroborated in the debriefing interviews.1
The frequency at which security warnings were displayed varied between every 10th and
15th website viewed to prevent participants’ detection of a fixed pattern. Before the
security incident, every participant saw a total of seven security warnings. After the
security incident, the warnings appeared at the same variable frequency as before until
all 182 experimental websites had been viewed, equating to approximately six to eight
warning screens displayed.

Post-survey
Upon completion of the image classification task, participants were asked to complete a
brief post-survey (see the appendix), which allowed us to compare whether self-reported
measures of information security risk increased after the security incident (H2).
Accordingly, we included the same measures of information security risk given on the
pre-test (perceived risk, threat susceptibility, and threat severity). We also quizzed
participants about how much they recalled from the pre-test to assess whether the pretest survey influenced their behavior during the image classification task. No participant
perfectly recalled the pre-test, although 3.7 percent of respondents correctly identified all
of the general topics of the pre-test. Approximately 27 percent reported that the pre-test
did influence their behavior, but of these, the average reported influence was moderate
(an average of 3.3 on a five-point Likert-type scale). Finally, a t-test showed no
difference in security warning disregard between those who claimed that the pre-test
influenced their behavior and those who did not (before a security incident: t = 1.08;

1

At least seven participants shut their laptop lids, powered off their laptops, unplugged the
network cable, and/or otherwise stopped the experiment after seeing the hacker screen.
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after: t = 1.10; both not significant). Therefore, we conclude that the pre-test had minimal
impact on the results of the image classification task.

Pilot Tests
In preparation for our study, we conducted two pilot tests. The first pilot test (N = 25)
consisted of the pre-test survey and the image classification task. The second pilot test
(N = 30) also included the IGT. After each pilot test, we made adjustments to the
experimental protocol based on participant feedback and analysis of the data. For
example, after the second pilot test, we found that electrical activity in the brain from the
motor act of pressing the keyboard button masked the signal of the ERP in response to
the IGT feedback. As a result, we instituted a 750 ms delay between deck selection and
win/loss feedback, which substantially reduced the noise in the data.

Primary Data Collection
Sixty-two healthy volunteers (16 females, 46 males) at a large private university in the
western United States were recruited to participate. The average age was 21.84 (std.
1.96). These participants were part of a research pool that gave extra credit points
toward a variety of university courses. Each extra credit point corresponded to .025
percent of the participants’ course grades. Participants were told (as a part of the signup process) that they would receive two extra credit points for completing all four steps
of the experiment. Prior to the second step (the IGT), participants were told that they
could receive a bonus extra credit point if they finished the IGT with a positive balance
and completed the image classification task in the “green zone.” However, all students
who completed all four steps were given three extra credit points.
Participants reported demographic variables such as age, gender, handedness (right:
55, left: 7), normal or corrected vision (yes: 59, no 3), colorblindness (no 58, yes: 4),
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whether they were a native English speaker (yes: 55, no: 7), and whether they had been
treated for a neurological or psychiatric condition (yes: 3, no: 59). These variables are
known to affect neural processing (Luck, 2005) and were later used as controls in our
analysis.

Analysis
We chose linear regression to test our hypotheses because it is a common form of
analysis for both EEG and field survey studies. Thus, regression provided a shared
method to assess both the self-reported and EEG-related hypotheses. Second, our
models were simple, having one or two independent variables depending on the
information security risk measure used. Therefore, a multivariate technique such as
structural equation modeling was unnecessary.
The dependent variable in our analysis was participants’ security warning disregard
during the image classification task. This was operationalized as the ratio of the number
of times participants actively chose to ignore the security warning (by clicking “Yes,
proceed anyway” on the security warning) over the total number of security screens
displayed. If a participant either clicked the “No, don’t proceed” button or took no action
before the timeout period, then we recorded that the security warning was not
disregarded. This ratio was calculated both before and after the security incident was
received.

Control Variable Analysis
We examined whether the control variables influenced security warning disregard using
stepwise regression. We found that for security warning disregard (before-incident), the
control variables had no significant influence. However, for security warning disregard
(after-incident), whether or not participants were native English speakers (seven non26

native speakers, 55 native) had a significant effect (-.281 standardized beta, t = -2.272
one-tailed, p < .05). Accordingly, we included this variable in our regressions involving
security warning disregard (after-incident).

Validation of Self-reported Measures
We validated our self-reported measures as follows. First, we tested the reliabilities of
our risk measures: general risk orientation, perceived security risk, perceived threat
susceptibility, and perceived threat severity, for both pre- and post-test measures. All
items exhibited a Cronbach’s alpha greater than .70, indicating good reliability (Nunnally,
1970). We then summed the items for each construct to create a single independent
variable to be used in the regression analysis. Second, we performed an exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) for perceived threat susceptibility and perceived threat severity to
ensure that these constructs functioned as distinct independent variables in the same
model (Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004).2 The EFA showed a clear pattern of loading
onto two factors, with all items loading onto the appropriate factor, consistent with
Johnston and Warkentin (2010). Therefore, we conclude that instrument validation was
sufficient to support statistical testing of our hypotheses.

Iowa Gambling Task Behavioral Performance
To assess performance in the IGT, we calculated the ratio of choices from the “risky”
decks (decks A and B) to choices from the “safe” decks (decks C and D) for each block
of 100 trials. Consistent with previous studies employing the IGT (e.g., Bechara et al.,
1994), participants switched from choosing more from the risky decks to choosing from

2

An EFA was not performed for perceived security risk, general risk perceptions, or risk income
preferences because these constructs were run in separate models as the only independent
variable or factor.
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the safe decks (mean ratio of 1.06, .83, .69, and .71 for blocks 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively). A repeated-measures ANOVA on the risky- to safe-choice ratio revealed a
main effect of block (F = 12.68, p < 0.001) and a significant linear trend across blocks (F
= 21.42, p < 0.001).

Hypothesis Testing
Testing the Impact of the Security Incident in the Experimental Task
First, we tested whether participants disregarded the security warning screens less
frequently after the hacker screen was received (hereafter referred to as the security
incident). A paired-sample t-test showed that, on average, participants disregarded the
security warning screen significantly less after a security incident (ratio of .66, of
warnings disregarded over warnings received) than before (.73), indicating a significant
decrease in security warning disregard (t = 2.192 one-tailed, p < 0.05). The impact of the
security warning screen was confirmed in the post-test survey, in which participants
reported that the security warning screen was both realistic and concerning (6.76 and
8.47 respectively, measured on a 0 to 10 scale). This supported H1, showing that
participants changed their security warning disregard after a security incident (see Table
2).
Table 2. Paired-sample t-test Comparing Security Warning Disregard before
and after a Security Incident (H1).
Mean of
SWD
(before
Incident)
.733

Mean of
SWD
(after
Incident)
.656

Mean of
Difference

.077

Std.
Deviation
of
Difference

Std. Error
Mean of
Difference

.274

.035

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
.007

Upper
.146

t
2.192*

* p < .05; degrees of freedom = 61; SWD = security warning disregard.

Next, we tested whether perceptions of information security risk increased after a
security incident. We would expect that the impact of the security incident would make
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information security risks more salient for participants, leading to a higher perception of
information security risks. Again, a paired-sample t-test analysis showed that threat
severity and threat susceptibility perceptions increased significantly by approximately 15
percent after participants had a security incident (an increase of 3.31 and 3.11,
respectively, in a range of 21; t = 6.104 one-tailed, p < .001). Likewise, perceived risk
also increased in the post-test, but not significantly (an increase of .57 out of a range of
21). We conclude that, while H2a for perceived risk was not significant, H2b for threat
severity and H2c for threat susceptibility were supported (see Table 3).
Table 3. Paired-sample t-test Comparing Perceptions of Information Security
Risk before and after the Security Incident.
H2a: for Perceived Security Risk of Malware (PSRM)
Mean of
Mean of
Mean of
Std.
Std. Error
PSRM
PSRM
Difference Deviation
Mean of
(before
(after
of
Difference
Incident)
Incident)
Difference
14.19
14.76
.565
3.911
H2b: for Threat Severity of Malware (TSEV)
Mean of
Mean of
Mean of
Std.
TSEV
TSEV
Difference Deviation
(before
(after
of
Incident)
Incident)
Difference
11.51
14.82
3.311
4.237
H2c: for Threat Susceptibility of Malware (TSUS)
Mean of
Mean of
Mean of
Std.
TSUS
TSUS
Difference Deviation
(before
(after
of
Incident)
Incident)
Difference
12.42

9.31

3.113

3.725

.497
Std. Error
Mean of
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
-.429

Std. Error
Mean of
Difference

2.226

1.558

1.558 ns

Upper
4.397

t
6.104*

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower

.473

t

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower

.542

Upper

2.167

Upper
4.059

t
6.581*

*** p < .001; ns = not significant; degrees of freedom = 61.

Testing the Predictive Validity of Self-reported Measures of IS Risk Perception
To test H3, we examined whether self-reported measures of information security risk
perceptions predict security warning disregard before a security incident. To do this, we
ran three separate regression equations with security warning disregard (before incident)
as the dependent variable and one of the three self-reported information security risk
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perception measures (threat severity, threat susceptibility, and perceived risk) as a
single independent variable (see Table 4). This allowed us to examine the effect of each
measure independently.3 As an additional test, we also examined whether general risk
orientation, namely general risk appetite and willingness to gamble lifetime income, also
predicted behavior. However, none of the above regression tests were significant.
Therefore, H3 was not supported—none of the self-reported security risk measures (H3a
for perceived risk, H3b for threat severity, H3c for threat susceptibility, H3d for general
risk appetite, and H3e for willingness to gamble lifetime income) predicted security
warning disregard before the security incident.

3

We also tested threat severity and threat susceptibility together since these measures are
designed to predict jointly (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). However, in this model, both factors
remained insignificant.
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Table 4. Regression Results for the Effects of Pre-test Risk Perception on Security
Warning Disregard (before Security Incident).
H3a: Perceived Security Risk of Malware—Pre-test
Model
ß
Intercept
.851
Perceived Security Risk of Malware—Pre-test -.008
Model statistics: R2 = .007; f = .419, p = .520
H3b: Threat Severity of Malware—Pre-test
Model
ß
Intercept
.673
Threat Severity of Malware—Pre-test
.006
Model statistics: R2 = .006; f = .377, p = .542
H3c: Threat Susceptibility of Malware—Pre-test
Model
ß
Intercept
.760
Threat Susceptibility of Malware—Pre-test -.003
Model statistics: R2 = .001; f = .056, p = .814
H3d: General Risk Appetite—Pre-test
Model
ß
Intercept 1.015
General Risk Appetite—Pre-test -.010
Model statistics: R2 = .020; f = 1.184, p = .281
H3e: Willingness to Gamble Lifetime Income—Pre-test
Model
ß
Intercept
.793
Willingness to Gamble Lifetime Income -.037
Model statistics: R2 = .012; f = .729, p = .397
*** p < .001; ns = not significant; one-tailed tests.

Std. Error
.189
.013

Standardized ß
—
-.083

t
4.493***
-.647 ns

Std. Error
.127
.010

Standardized ß
—
.080

t
5.306***
.614 ns

Std. Error
.127
.012

Standardized ß
—
-.031

t
6.004***
-.236 ns

Std. Error
.254
.009

Standardized ß
—
-.140

t
4.002***
-1.088 ns

Std. Error
.087
.043

Standardized ß
—
-.110

t
9.106***
-.854 ns

We also hypothesized that self-reported measures of risk would be more effective at
predicting security warning disregard after a security incident compared to before a
security incident (H4). To test this hypothesis, we followed the same procedure as
described above for testing H3, with the difference that we tested security warning
disregard after incident as the dependent variable and used post-test measurements for
threat severity, threat susceptibility, perceived risk, and both threat severity and threat
susceptibility in the same model. Our results showed that the post-test measurement of
perceived risk (-.252 standardized beta, t = -2.069 one-tailed, p < .05) and threat
susceptibility significantly (-.294 standardized beta, t = -2.448 one-tailed, p < .05)
reduced security warning disregard (see Table 5). Thus, H4a for perceived risk and H4c
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for threat susceptibility were supported.4 However, H4b for threat severity was not. Our
hypothesis that self-reported measures would be more predictive immediately after
subjects experienced a salient security incident is only supported for threat susceptibility.
Table 5. Regression Results for the Effects of Post-test Risk Perception on Security
Warning Disregard (after Security Incident).
H4a: Perceived Security Risk of Malware—Post-test
Model
ß
Std. Error Standardized ß
Intercept 1.436
.262
—
Native English Speaker -.435
.168
-.316
Perceived Security Risk of Malware—Posttest -.028
.013
-.252
Model statistics: R2 = .142; f = 4.863 , p = .011
H4b: Threat Severity of Malware—Post-test
Model
ß
Std. Error Standardized ß
Intercept 1.092
.268
—
Native English Speaker -.401
.175
-.291
Threat Severity of Malware—Post-test -.005
.013
-.055
Model statistics: R2 = .082; f = 2.640, p = .080
H4c: Threat Susceptibility of Malware—Post-test
Model
ß
Std. Error Standardized ß
Intercept 1.423
.232
—
Native English Speaker -.446
.166
-.324
Threat Susceptibility of Malware—Post-test -.030
.012
-.294
Model statistics: R2 = .164; f = 5.793, p = .005
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ns = not significant; one-tailed tests.

t
5.475***
-2.595**
-2.069*

t
4.077***
-2.298*
-.432 ns

t
6.142***
-2.692**
-2.448*

Testing of the Predictive Validity of EEG Measures of Risk Perception
Next, we tested the predictive validity of our EEG measures of risk perception. To do
this, we used the P300 ERP component as the independent variable. The P300
amplitudes were extracted as the mean amplitude within the 300–600 ms post-stimulus
window (Fjell & Walhovd, 2001). Latencies were calculated as the 50 percent area
latency (Bashore & Ridderinkhof, 2002; Polich & Corey-Bloom, 2005) for the 300–600
ms post-stimulus window.

4

We also tested whether pre-test measures for self-reported risk predicted post-consequence
security warning disregard. In this case, perceived risk had a significant negative effect (-.22
standardized beta, p < .05), but threat susceptibility had no effect.
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We calculated each participant’s P300 responses to gain/loss feedback subsequent to
deck selections in the IGT. The deck selections of special interest for our context were
the highest-risk deck (deck B with high-penalty and low-frequency) and the lowest-risk
deck (deck C with low-penalty and high-frequency). These decks provided the greatest
contrast to participants’ responses to penalties incurred in the IGT. In the course of the
experiment, participants chose from deck B an average of 94.7 times (SD=29.9, min=53,
max=160). Penalties in this deck are high-magnitude and low-frequency; participants
received an average of 6.5 B penalty trials (SD=3.8, min=1, max = 16). Participants
chose from deck C an average of 104.9 times (SD=29.1, min=38, max=160). Penalties
in this deck are of lower magnitude and higher frequency; participants received an
average of 34.5 C penalty trials (SD=17.5, min=1, max=73; see Appendix E for more
information). As noted previously (see section “Electrophysiological Data Recording and
Processing”), trials were randomly selected from conditions with higher trials counts to
reduce bias due to differential trial counts.
Next, to highlight the contrast between risky and safe feedback, we calculated a
difference curve or score by subtracting the activity observed for the C penalty response
from that of the B penalty response (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000)
(see Figure 4). This technique suppresses activity that is common between two
experimental conditions, leaving only the difference of what is truly distinct (Hoormann,
Falkenstein, Schwarzenau, & Hohnsbein, 1998).
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Figure 4. Event-related Potentials between 300 and 600 ms for Responses to
B and C Deck Penalties and Their Difference at the Pz Electrode Site.5

Consistent with previous literature examining feedback-related ERPs (San Martín et al.,
2013), we analyzed the P300 using the mean ERP amplitude 300-600ms after stimulus
onset (Figure 4 shaded area; see Appendix F for further detail).

A topographical

analysis of our difference data showed two potential peaks in the 300-600ms time
window; one that was situated more frontally and peaked earlier, probably representing
the P3a subcomponent of the P300, and another that was situated more posteriorly and
peaked slightly later, probably reflecting the P3b subcomponent of the P300. The
greatest P300 amplitude differences were observed in the parietal (Pz) region of the
scalp (see Figure 5). Therefore, we used measures from this region in our analyses.
Hence, our calculated independent variable was the difference in mean activity between
the B penalty and the C penalty at the Pz electrode site (i.e., a B penalty minus C
penalty difference score).

5

Mean amplitude for the P300 was extracted during the 300–600 ms post-stimulus epoch (shaded) deck
penalties.
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Figure 5. Topographical Heat Map of P300 Amplitudes for
Responses to B and C Deck Penalties and Their Difference.

First, we tested whether our difference score measure of risk predicted security warning
disregard in the before-incident phase of the image classification task (H5). We found
that the difference score had a significant influence on security warning disregard—
before-incident (standardized beta of -.277, t = -2.235 one-tailed, p < .05). This indicates
a medium effect size following Cohen’s classification of effect sizes (where small,
medium, and large effects correspond to .10, .30, and .50, respectively (Cohen, 1992).
Therefore, H5 was supported (see Table 6). This was in contrast to the self-reported
measures, which had no effect before the security incident.
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Table 6. Regression Results for the Effects of P300 Difference Score on Security
Warning Disregard (before a Security Incident).
H5: P300 Difference Score
Model

ß
.766
-.028

Std. Error
.051
.013

Intercept
P300 Difference Score
Model statistics: R2 = .077; f = 4.997, p = .029
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ns = not significant; one-tailed tests.

Standardized ß
—
-.277

t
14.940***
-2.235*

Next, we tested whether the difference score predicted security warning disregard better
after a security incident compared to before a security incident (H6). A regression
analysis showed that the difference score did predict security warning disregard afterincident (standardized beta of -.324, t = -2.750 one-tailed, p < .01) (see Table 7).
Table 7. Regression Results for the Effects of P300 Difference Score on Security
Warning Disregard (after Security Incident)
H6: P300 Difference Score
Model

ß
Std. Error Standardized ß
Intercept 1.014
.153
—
Native English Speaker -.355
.162
-.258
P300 Difference Score -.036
.013
-.324
2
Model statistics: R = .184; f = 6.644, p = .002
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ns = not significant; one-tailed tests.

t
6.649***
-2.185*
-2.750**

The difference in the size of the standardized path coefficients before and after the
security incident was -.047 (-.324 less -.277). To test whether this difference was
significant, we used a SAS 9.2 macro to bootstrap our sample following the procedure
described in (Hayes, 2009). In this approach, we randomly selected, with replacement,
62 observations from our dataset of 62. We then ran two separate regression models:
the difference score regressed on security warning disregard before the security incident
as well as after, saving the resulting path coefficients. We repeated this process to
obtain 1,000 resamples and associated path coefficients, as 1,000 or more resamples
are recommended (Hayes, 2009). Next, we calculated the difference between the
coefficients in each resample (e.g., standardized βResample1 difference score [after36

incident] - standardized βResample1 difference score [before-incident], standardized
βResample2 difference score [after-incident] - standardized βResample2 difference score
[before-incident], etc.).
We next sorted the difference values of the resampled coefficients from largest to
smallest to create a percentile-based confidence interval ci% using the formula k(.5 ci/200) for the lower bound and the formula 1 + k(.5 + ci/200) for the upper bound, where
k is the number of resamples (Hayes, 2009). In our case, we obtained 1,000 resamples
and specified a 95% confidence interval. For the sorted values of the differences of the
coefficients, the lower bound of the confidence interval was represented by the value in
the 25th position, whereas the upper bound was denoted by the value in the 975th
position. For the constructed confidence interval, if zero is not between the lower and
upper bound, then one can state with ci% confidence that the difference between the
coefficients is not zero (MacKinnon, 2008). Table 8 reports the results of the 95%
confidence interval test. Because zero was included within the confidence interval, we
conclude that the effect of difference score on after-incident behavior was not
significantly greater than its effect on before-incident behavior. Therefore, H6 was not
supported. The effect of the P300 difference score on behavior was essentially the same
before as it was after the security incident.
Table 8. Bootstrapped Confidence Interval to Test for an Increase in the Strength
of the P300 Difference Score after a Security Incident (H6).
Variable

Std. β difference score (after-incident) Std. β difference score (before-incident)

Confidence Interval
2.5%
97.5%
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-.230
.029

Zero
within
Interval?

H6
Supported?

Yes

No
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Comparing the Relative Predictive Strength of Self-reported and EEG
Measures of Risk
Having tested the effects of the self-reported and EEG measures of risk separately, we
then compared the relative strength of the self-reported risk perception measures and
the EEG P300 difference score measure. Consistent with the results of H3 and H5, only
the difference score had a significant effect on the security warning disregard—beforeincident. Thus, H7 was supported—that is, in every case (H7a for perceived risk, H7b for
threat severity, and H7c for threat susceptibility), EEG measures of risk were more
predictive of security warning disregard before-incident than were the self-reported
measures.
Finally, to test H8, we followed the same process as for testing H7, with the difference
that we now examined security warning disregard after-incident as the dependent
variable. The variables perceived risk (post-test), threat susceptibility (post-test), and
difference score independently had significant negative effects on security warning
disregard after-incident (see testing for H4 and H6 above). To test whether the path
coefficient of the difference score was significantly greater than those of the self-reported
measures, we followed the same bootstrapping procedure described for our tests of H6
above. We individually bootstrapped the effects of perceived risk (post-test), threat
susceptibility (post-test), and difference score on after-incident behavior and saved the
coefficients. This resulted in 1,000 resamples for each coefficient. We then calculated
the difference between each resampled pair and sorted the resulting difference scores to
create a 95 percent confidence interval. In both cases, zero was inside the 95 percent
interval (see Table 9).
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Table 9. Bootstrapped Confidence Interval to Compare the Strength of the P300
Difference Score with Self-reported Risk Measures (after Incident) (H8).
Variable

Std. β P300 difference score - std. β
perceived risk (after-incident)
Std. β P300 difference score - std. β
threat susceptibility (after-incident)

Confidence Interval
2.5%
97.5%
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-.418
0.169

Zero
within
Interval?

H8
Supported?

Yes

H8a: No

-.356

Yes

H8c: No

.290

Thus, H8b for threat severity was supported, but H8a for perceived risk and H8c for
threat susceptibility were not. The EEG measures were no more effective in predicting
security warning disregard after the adverse incident was received than were the posttest measures of perceived risk and threat susceptibility.
The results of our hypothesis testing are summarized in Table 10 below.
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Table 10. Summary of Hypothesis Testing.
Hypothesis
H1. Security warning disregard before a security incident will be higher
than security warning disregard after a security incident.
H2. Pre-test self-reported measures of risk perception will be lower before
a security incident than post-test self-reported measures of risk perception
after a security incident.
a. for perceived risk
b. for threat severity
c. for threat susceptibility
H3. Pre-test self-reported measures of risk perception will negatively
predict security warning disregard before a security incident is imposed.
a. for perceived risk
b. for threat severity
c. for threat susceptibility
d. for general risk appetite
e. for willingness to gamble lifetime income
H4. Post-test self-reported measures of risk perception will negatively
predict security warning disregard after a security incident is imposed
better than pre-test measures negatively predict security warning
disregard before a security incident is imposed.
a. for perceived risk
b. for threat severity
c. for threat susceptibility
H5. Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security
warning disregard before a security incident is imposed.
H6. Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security
warning disregard after a security incident is imposed better than will the
same P300 amplitude measures before a security incident is imposed.
H7. Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security
warning disregard better than pre-test self-reported measures of risk
perception before a security incident is imposed.
a. for EEG superior to perceived risk
b. for EEG superior to threat severity
c. for EEG superior to threat susceptibility
H8. Pre-test P300 amplitude measures will negatively predict security
warning disregard better than will post-test self-reported measures of risk
perception after a security incident is imposed.
a. for EEG superior to perceived risk
b. for EEG superior to threat severity
c. for EEG superior to threat susceptibility

Supported?
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No

Discussion
The results of this study provide several important contributions to research on
information security risk perceptions and their measurement, as summarized in Table 11
below. In the following, we elaborate on each of these contributions.
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Table 11. Research Contributions.
Element of Research
P300 measure of risk
propensity
Self-reported
measures of risk
perceptions
P300 measure of risk
propensity and selfreported measures of
risk perceptions
Security warning
behavior and selfreported measures of
risk perceptions

Contributions
The P300 difference score proved the strongest predictor, significantly
predicting security warning disregard both before and after a security
incident.
Self-reported measures of information security risk perception did not
predict security warning disregard before a security incident, indicating
a poor correspondence with behavior in this experimental setting.
After a security incident, perceived risk and threat susceptibility
significantly predicted security warning behavior to essentially the
same degree as the P300 difference score. This suggests that selfreported measures are better predictors when information security
risks are salient. In contrast, the P300 difference score was a strong
predictor even when information security risks were not salient.
Security warning disregard and self-reported measures of risk
perception change with the introduction of an adverse consequence.

First, we found that the P300 difference score, derived from participants’ P300
amplitudes in response to losses in the IGT, was the strongest predictor of security
warning disregard in our study (H5, H7). It was also the most robust measure, as it
predicted security warning disregard consistently before and after a security incident
(H6). Accordingly, this study provides evidence that NeuroIS measures of risk propensity
can predict security behavior. In doing so, this paper responds to the call for the use of
NeuroIS methods to study information security behaviors (Anderson et al., 2012;
Crossler et al., 2013).
Second, we found that a variety of self-reported risk measures—five different measures
in all—failed to predict security warning disregard before the security incident was
imposed (H3). This was a surprising finding and counter to our hypotheses. The levels of
risk perception of the self-reported measures were moderate to high in all cases.
However, despite this, these measures were weakly and insignificantly correlated with
security warning disregard. This finding is consistent with previous studies on security
and privacy risk that showed that participants reported high levels of concern about their
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privacy and online security but later behaved contrarily to their stated apprehensiveness
(Acquisti & Grossklags, 2004; Belanger et al., 2002; Norberg et al., 2007). This has
important implications for research involving information security risk perceptions.
Third, this paper contributes the interesting finding that self-reported measures of
information security risk were insignificant before a security incident; however, after an
incident, perceived risk and threat susceptibility predicted security warning disregard
more or less equally with the P300 difference score (H4, H8). This finding is anticipated
by Dimoka et al. (2012; 2011), who observed that many emotions—such as fear and
uncertainty—are not processed consciously and are therefore difficult to measure using
self-reported measures. Thus, initially, the self-reported measures did not accurately
reflect participants’ actual attitudes toward information security risk. However, after a
security incident, attitudes toward information security risk became salient and were
processed consciously by the participants. This conclusion is supported by the fact that
measures of threat severity and threat susceptibility significantly increased after a
security incident (H2).
In contrast, the P300 difference score measured a correlate of the neural response as
early as 300 ms after receiving the IGT loss stimulus. The amplitude of the P300 ERP
component has been shown to be sensitive to target probability and is influenced by
participants’ expectations (for a review, see Polich, 2007). As the probability of a loss in
the various decks in the IGT was the same for each participant, the target probability
(i.e., the probability of a loss in a particular deck) cannot account for variations in the
difference scores between participants. Thus, in our experiment, the P300 difference
score appeared to be more in line with participants’ actual security warning disregard.
This measure was unrelated to the perceptions of information security risk participants
espoused before the incident and was therefore a far more accurate predictor of actual
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security warning disregard (H5). After a security incident, the P300 difference score
continued significantly to predict security warning disregard, indicating robust predictive
validity (H6; Straub et al., 2004).
It is interesting to note that perceived risk and threat susceptibility, but not threat
severity, became significant after a security incident. Although this was contrary to our
hypothesis, this result is reasonable given that the severity of the security incident for
each participant was apparently nil—contrary to the dire claim reported by the hacker
screen that data on the participant’s laptop would be erased. Therefore, while
participants recognized that they were more susceptible to malware than they initially
thought, they had no cause to change their attitudes about the severity of such attacks.
This explanation also holds for the measure of perceived risk because its items combine
the concepts of susceptibility and severity into the same measure. Thus, because
perceptions of susceptibility increased, the predictive power of perceived risk increased
as well.
Finally, we showed that people’s behavior and attitudes do change after a security
incident—security warning disregard significantly decreased while risk perceptions
significantly increased (H1, H2). This finding is also consistent with research showing
that users substantially alter their computing behaviors to be more cautious after being
compromised by malware (Fox, 2005; Good et al., 2005). This result, though expected,
nonetheless demonstrates that information security risk perceptions are not static but
change as people gain experience with information security threats.

Methodological Implications
From the aforementioned findings, two primary methodological implications are evident.
First, the P300 difference score from the Iowa Gambling Task is a good measure of risk
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propensity and a significant predictor of security warning disregard. This indicates that
researchers who wish to measure information security risk perceptions should consider
using an EEG measure of risk because of its superior predictive power. It also suggests
that other NeuroIS methods may be similarly effective in predicting information security
behavior because of their ability to avoid measurement biases. Moreover, our findings
demonstrate the value of capturing information security risk at an unconscious level,
which is possible using a variety of NeuroIS methods, such as fMRI and galvanic skin
response (Dimoka et al., 2011).
Second, our findings show that self-reported measures of information security risk and
risk generally were not effective predictors of security behavior in this experimental
setting until a security incident was salient in a person’s recent experience. This
suggests that researchers might profitably use self-reported measures in a post-test
after an experimental treatment that simulates a security incident. Alternatively,
researchers might try measuring past experiences with information security incidents (as
per Anderson & Agarwal, 2010) to help qualify self-reported measures of risk.
Additionally, self-reported measures of information security risk might be used to
triangulate data collected using NeuroIS or other behavioral methods (Dimoka et al.,
2011).
However, researchers should use caution when attempting to use self-reported
measures of information security risk as a predictor of information security intentions.
Although information security risks have been shown to be significant predictors of
security-related intentions in the past (e.g., Guo et al., 2011; Malhotra et al., 2004), this
research as well as others suggests that this predictive ability may not translate into
actual security behavior (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2004; Belanger et al., 2002; Crossler et
al., 2013).
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Limitations and Future Research
This study has several limitations that point to future research opportunities. For
example, this study examined security warning disregard as the only form of security
behavior. It is possible that other forms of security behavior may be more amenable to
prediction using self-reported measures of risk.
Similarly, this study made use of only one NeuroIS method—EEG. It is possible that
using different NeuroIS methods such as fMRI may yield different results. Future
research should attempt to measure information security risk perceptions using other
techniques to determine the most effective methods to measure the construct of
information security risk. Further, one or more NeuroIS methods in combination could be
used to produce more reliable measurements (Dimoka et al., 2012).
Another limitation is that we did not use EEG to measure information security risk per se.
Rather, we used EEG to measure participants’ responses to gains and losses in the IGT,
a widely-used technique in the fields of psychology and neuroscience that has been
shown to be strongly correlated with real-world risky behaviors (Buelow & Suhr, 2009).
The P300 has been observed widely in ERP studies and seems to be generated any
time a task requires stimulus discrimination (for a review, see Polich, 2007).
Furthermore, the different subcomponents of the P300 (namely the P3a and P3b) may
reflect different underlying neural computations. Previous P300 research has indicated
that the amplitude of the P300 is influenced by the local probability of a target stimulus
occurring (Polich & Margala, 1997). Because of how the IGT is structured, this almost
certainly has an influence on the amplitude of the P300 in response to the B penalty
(relatively infrequent) and the C penalty (relatively frequent). While stimulus probability
explains the difference in the amplitudes in these conditions, it does not explain why this
difference predicts subsequent security warning disregard. Similarly, it has been
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suggested that the amplitude of the P300 is related to attentional processes (Kok, 1990)
or neural inhibition (Polich, 2007). If participants devote fewer attentional resources to
losses of different magnitudes or frequencies, or, alternatively, if they are less likely to
inhibit non-related processes following a high-magnitude loss, they may be less likely to
attend to security warnings in another context.
These disparate explanations are accounted for by another influential theory of the
purpose of the P300—the context-updating theory (Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles,
1988). As discussed previously, the P300 reflects changing mental representations of
the ongoing task structure in response to incoming stimuli. The context-updating theory
can account for a number of findings in the P300 literature, including those listed above
(Polich, 2007). For example, infrequent targets may demand more cognitive resources to
update ongoing task representations and thus produce a larger P300. In the context of
risk perception, the P300 may be reduced in cases of individuals who are less
responsive to negative outcomes and are therefore more risk-seeking. Previous
research has demonstrated that risk perceptions measured using EEG during the IGT do
predict other risk behaviors (Bianchin & Angrilli, 2011; Schuermann, Kathmann,
Stiglmayr, Renneberg, & Endrass, 2011). The results of our study are consistent with
this previous body of work by showing that the P300 difference score does significantly
predict security behavior. Thus, it exhibited strong predictive validity (Straub et al.,
2004), demonstrating its value as an information security risk measure.
Another limitation is the ability of our results to generalize given the necessary artificiality
of the laboratory environment and the use of student subjects. However, the raison
d'être for laboratory experimentation is not external validity but precision and control
(Dennis & Valacich, 2001; McGrath, 1981). Similarly, student subjects typically represent
a homogenous sample that reduces noise and thereby provides the strictest test of the
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hypotheses (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1982). Regardless, as young people spend a
proportionately large amount of time online compared with the general population (Pew
Research Center, 2012), students frequently encounter threats from security and are
therefore a valid sample to study information security risk perceptions and security
warning disregard.
Additionally, there is a chance that our design choice may have introduced some
reciprocal causation. That is, in the interest of completing the task, participants may
have disregarded security warnings as quickly as possible to continue with the
classification. Thus, those who sought to optimize the image classification task may
have exhibited the highest level of security warning disregard (the dependent variable).
However, this possibility was considered in our design of the experiment for two
reasons. First, we intentionally tried to emulate real life, in which an individual is typically
striving to complete a task when a pop-up warning or message is received and therefore
tries to remove an interfering item as quickly as possible. Dual-task interference theory
explains the difficulty people have when trying to perform two or more tasks, even
relatively simple ones (Pashler, 1994). Further, recent research (Jenkins & Durcikova,
2013) asserts that is it possible to predict a disconnect between security intentions and
behaviors due to the cognitive load of two simultaneous tasks. Consequently, we
designed the experiment so that the participants would have to deal with a time-sensitive
competing task when responding to the security warning. Second, as noted previously,
people routinely sacrifice promised information security for some other utility. Thus, the
temptation to ignore the security warnings received on their personal laptops in
exchange for better performance in the image classification also mirrored real life.
Finally, our sample consisted of 62 participants. While more data is generally better, our
regression models involved only one or two predictors at one time. As the “rule of ten”
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sample size heuristic for regression suggests ten observations per predictor (Chin,
1998), this indicates that our sample size was sufficient. Further, Dimoka (2012) pointed
out that, although sample sizes tend to be smaller for NeuroIS studies due to the
expense and time commitment required per subject, NeuroIS methods generally provide
many data points per subject. In our case, we collected 400 behavioral observations per
participant while recording EEGs at 250 Hz. Thus, the amount of data captured and
used in our analysis was actually much greater than a sample size of 62 would suggest.

Conclusion
We demonstrated that participants’ EEG P300 amplitudes in response to losses in a
risk-taking experimental task strongly predicted security warning disregard in a
subsequent and unrelated computing task using participants’ own laptop computers. By
comparison, self-reported measures of information security risk did not predict security
warning disregard. However, after secretly simulating a malware incident on the
participants’ own laptops, post-test measures of information security risk perception did
predict participants’ security warning disregard after a security incident. This suggests
that self-reported measures of information security risk can significantly predict security
behavior when security risks are salient. In contrast, the P300 risk measure is a
significant predictor of security behavior both before and after a security incident is
imposed, highlighting the robustness of NeuroIS methods in measuring risk perceptions
and their value in predicting security behavior.
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Appendix A. Survey Instrumentation
Table A-1. Survey Constructs
Construct

Pre/Post
(Mean, Std.)

Willingness to
Gamble Lifetime
Income

Pre-test
(1.65, 1.19)

General risk
appetite

Pre-test
(27.56, 5.58)

Perceived security
risk of malware†

Threat
susceptibility†

Pre-test
(14.19, 3.99)
Post-test
(14.76, 4.08)
Pre-test
(9.31, 4.13)
Post-test
(12.42, 4.32)

Questions
Suppose that you are the only income earner
in the family, and you have a good job
guaranteed to give you and your current
(family) income every year for life. You are
given the opportunity to take a new and
equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it
will double your (family) income and a 50-50
chance that it will cut your (family) income by
a third. Would you take the new job?
- If yes, suppose the chances were 50-50
that it would double your (family) income,
and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. Would
you still take the new job?
- If no to the first question, suppose the
chances were 50-50 that it would double
your (family) income and 50-50 that it would
cut it by 20 percent. Would you then take the
new job?
Some people say you should be cautious
about making major changes in life. Suppose
these people are located at 1. Others say
that you will never achieve much in life
unless you act boldly. Suppose these people
are located at 7. Others have views in
between. Where would you place yourself on
this scale?
I would like to explore strange places.
I like to do frightening things.
I like new and exciting experiences, even if I
have to break the rules.
I prefer friends who are exciting and
unpredictable.
In general, it is easy for me to accept taking
risks.
Ignoring malware warning screens can cause
damages to computer security.
Ignoring malware warning screens can put
important data at risk.
Ignoring malware warning screens will most
likely cause security breaches.
My computer is at risk for becoming infected
with malware.
It is likely that my computer will become
infected with malware.
It is possible that my computer will become
infected with malware.

Source

Barsky et al.,
1997

Kam & Simas,
2010

Guo et al.,
2011

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010
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Pre-test
(11.51, 5.01)
Threat severity†
Post-test
(14.77, 4.43)
Bias‡

Post-test
(3.29, .77)

Malware warning
screen realism*

Post-test
(6.76, 3.03)

Hacker screen
realism*

Post-test
(4.76, 3.44)

Malware warning
screen concern**

Post-test
(4.47, 2.95)

If my computer were infected by malware, it
would be severe.
If my computer were infected by malware, it
would be serious.
If my computer were infected by malware, it
would be significant.
How much did the pre-study survey influence
your behavior on the image classification
task?
On a scale of 0 to 10, how realistic do you
think the following screen is? (malware
warning screen)
On a scale of 0 to 10, how realistic do you
think the following screen is? (hack screen)
On a scale of 0 to 10, how concerned did the
following screen make you feel during the
image classification task? (malware warning
screen)

Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010

None

None

None

On a scale of 0 to 10, how concerned did the
following screen make you feel during the
image classification task? (hack screen)
What is your age? (mean 21.84, std. 1.96)
What is your gender? (male: 46, female 16)
What is your handedness? (right: 55, left: 7)
Are you a native English speaker? (native:
55, not native: 7)
Demographic
Pre-test
Control
Do you have normal/corrected to normal
questions
variables
vision? (yes: 59, no: 3)
Have you ever had an EEG? (yes: 6, no: 56)
Have you ever been treated for a
neurological or psychiatric condition? (yes: 3,
no: 59)
Are you color blind? (yes: 4, no: 58)
† These questions used a 7-point Likert scale with a range from 1 (strongly disagree to 7 (strongly
agree).
Hacker screen
concern**

‡

Post-test
(6.47, 2.91)

This question used a 5-point Likert scale with a range from 1 (not at al)l to 5 (very strongly).

* These questions had a scale from 0 (not realistic) to 10 (100% realistic) and from 0 (not concerned at
all) to 10 (extremely concerned).
** This question had a scale from 0 (not concerned) at all to 10 (extremely concerned).
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Table A-2. List of Acronyms.
DTPB
Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior
EEG
Electroencephalography
EFA
Exploratory factor analysis
EMF
Electric magnetic fields
ERP
Event-related potentials
fMRI
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
ICA
Independent components analysis
IGT
Iowa Gambling Task
ISP
Information security policy
PCA
Principal components analysis
PET
Positron emission technology
PLS
Partial least squares
PMT
Protection Motivation Theory
PSRM
Perceived security risk of malware
Pz
Parietal region of scalp
TPB
Theory of Planned Behavior
TSEV
Threat severity of malware
TSUS
Threat susceptibility of malware
TTAT
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory
SCR
Skin conductance responses
SWD
Security warning disregard
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Table A-3. Construct Correlation Matrix.
Construct
Security warning
disregard—before SI (1)
Security warning
disregard—after SI (2)

Mean

Std.

1

0.74

0.39

N/A

0.65

0.45

.70**

P300 difference score (3)
Willingness to gamble
lifetime income (4)

3.43

2.85 -.18*

1.51

1.18

General risk appetite (5)
Perceived security risk of
malware-pre-test (6)
Perceived security risk of
malware-post-test (7)
Threat susceptibility of
malware—pre-test (8)
Threat susceptibility of
malware—post-test (9)
Threat severity of
malware—pre-test (10)
Threat severity of
malware—post-test (11)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

N/A
-.27**

N/A

.01

.09

.09

N/A

27.86

5.84 -.13

-.13

.06

.27**

.76

14.33

3.89 -.04

-.04

-.04

-.14

.05

.84

14.98

3.86

.07

-.04

-.02

.00

.05

.49**

.87

9.45

4.04 -.04

-.08

.04

-.13

-.14

.07

.10

.79

12.42

4.04 -.06

-.17†

.07

-.17

-.08

.21*

.54**

.58**

.81

11.04

4.69

.02

.00

.11

.04

.00

.32**

.39**

.35**

.48**

.95

14.55

4.37

.12

.01

.10

-.08

-.04

.25**

.59**

.03

.35**

.50**

.95

N.B. Cronbach’s α provided on the diagonal where applicable.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; † This correlation is significant when the variable native English speaker is controlled for.
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APPENDIX B. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF IS SECURITY RISK
PERCEPTIONS MEASURES
To identify measures of IS security risk perception, we performed a literature review using the
following criteria. First, we searched all issues of the AIS Basket of six journals from their
inception to February 2013 for articles that mentioned security in the title, abstract, or keywords.
This resulted in 128 articles. From this set, we narrowed the articles to those that also
mentioned the word “risk” anywhere in the body of the article. We then searched each of the
resulting articles for survey items related to IS risk perceptions, which yielded nine articles. Of
these, two addressed privacy rather than security issues and so were excluded. From this final
set of seven, three articles measured risk perceptions using a combination of threat severity and
threat susceptibility measures (Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue,
2010). We chose the Johnston and Warkentin (2010) measures because they are
representative of this set of articles and because they also measured risk perceptions of
malware specifically. The other four articles (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Gefen, 2002; Guo et
al., 2011; Van Slyke, Shim, Johnson, & Jiang, 2006) used items to measure risk perceptions as
a single construct. We therefore chose the Guo et al. (2011) measures because they are
representative of this set of articles and because they were most naturally adaptable to the
context of malware. In summary, we chose two sets of items that are representative of IS
security risk perception measures in use in the IS literature. Further, selecting two different sets
of IS security risk perception items ensured that our results were not dependent on any one set
of items.
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Table B-1. Security-related Risk Perception Items.
Reference
Guo, K. H., Yuan, Y., Archer, N.
P., & Connelly, C. E. (2011).
Understanding
nonmalicious
security
violations
in
the
workplace: A composite behavior
model. Journal of Management
Information Systems, 28(2), 203236.
Anderson, C. L., & Agarwal, R.
(2010).
Practicing
safe
computing:
A
multimedia
empirical examination of home
computer user security behavioral
intentions. MIS Quarterly, 34(3),
613-643.

Johnston, A. C., & Warkentin, M.
(2010).
Fear
appeals
and
information security behaviors:
An empirical study. MIS quarterly,
34(3), 549.

Liang, H., & Xue, Y. (2010).
Understanding security behaviors
in personal computer usage: A
threat avoidance perspective.
Journal of the Association for
Information Systems, 11(7), 394413.

Measures
Perceived Security risk of NMSV (Non-malicious security violations)
Risk 1: the action can cause damages to computer security.
Risk 2: the action can put important data at risk.
Risk 3: the action will most likely cause security breaches.

Concern (adapted from Ellen and Wiener 1991; Ho 1998; Obermiller
1995)
Anchors 1 = Not at All Concerned, 7 = Very Concerned
Some experts have warned that hackers may try to cripple major
American businesses or the government by breaking into their
computers or by using home computers to attack other computers
using the Internet. How concerned are you that hackers might...?
• Harm American corporations or the government by breaking into
their computers
• Break into home computers and use them to attack computers
owned by American corporations or the government
• Break into your home computer and use your e-mail account to
send spam to others
• Use home computers to spread a virus over the Internet that harms
other computers
• Steal or change data stored on your computer
• Gain access to your personal financial information
• Gain access to your personal health/medical information
• Gain access to other personal data (such as family photos, hobby
information, shopping preferences, and/or school data)
Threat Severity
1. If my computer were infected by spyware, it would be severe
(TSEV1).
2. If my computer were infected by spyware, it would be serious
(TSEV2).
3. If my computer were infected by spyware, it would be significant
(TSEV3).
Threat Susceptibility
4. My computer is at risk of becoming infected with spyware
(TSUS1).
5. It is likely that my computer will become infected with spyware
(TSUS2).
6. It is possible that my computer will become infected with spyware
(TSUS3).
Perceived Susceptibility (1 = strong disagree, 7 = strongly disagree)
It is extremely likely that my computer will be infected by spyware in
the future.
My chances of getting spyware are great.
There is a good possibility that my computer will have spyware.
I feel spyware will infect my computer in the future.
It is extremely likely that spyware will infect my computer.
Perceived severity (1 = innocuous, 7 = extremely devastating)
Spyware would steal my personal information from my computer
without my knowledge.
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Spyware would invade my privacy.
My personal information collected by spyware could be misused by
cyber criminals.
Spyware could record my Internet activities and send it to unknown
parties.
My personal information collected by spyware could be subject to
unauthorized secondary use.
My personal information collected by spyware could be used to
commit crimes against me.
Spyware would slow down my Internet connection.
Spyware would make my computer run more slowly.
Spyware would cause system crash on my computer from time to
time.
Spyware would affect some of my computer programs and make
them difficult to use.

Herath, T., & Rao, H. R. (2009).
Protection
motivation
and
deterrence: A framework for
security policy compliance in
organisations. European Journal
of Information Systems, 18(2),
106-125.

Van Slyke, C., Shim, J., Johnson,
R., & Jiang, J. (2006). Concern
for information privacy and online
consumer purchasing. Journal of
the Association for Information
Systems, 7(6), 415-444.

Gefen, D. (2002). Customer
loyalty in e-commerce. Journal of
the Association for Information
Systems, 27(51), 51.

Perceived threat (1 = strong disagree, 7 = strongly disagree)
Spyware poses a threat to me.
The trouble caused by spyware threatens me.
Spyware is a danger to my computer.
It is dreadful if my computer is infected by spyware.
It is risky to use my computer if it has spyware.
Perceived probability of security breach
How likely is it that a security violation will cause a significant outage
that will result in loss of productivity?
How likely is it that a security violation will cause a significant outage
to the Internet that results in financial losses to organizations?
How likely is it that the organization will lose sensitive data due to a
security violation?
Perceived severity of security breach
I believe that information stored on organization computers is
vulnerable to security incidents.
I believe the productivity of organization and its employees is
threatened by security incidents.
I believe the profitability of organizations is threatened by security
incidents.
Risk Perceptions
All anchors on 7-point scale anchored on Very strongly disagree to
Very strongly agree.
How would you characterize the decision of whether to buy a product
from this Web retailer (Amazon.com/Half.com)? (Anchors: Very
significant risk to Very significant opportunity)
How would you characterize the decision of whether to buy a product
from this Web retailer (Amazon.com/Half.com)? (Anchors: Very high
potential for loss to Very high potential for gain)
How would you characterize the decision of whether to buy a product
from this Web retailer (Amazon.com/Half.com)? (Anchors: Very
negative situation to Very positive situation)
Perceived risk with vendor:
There is a significant threat doing business with Amazon.com.
There is a significant potential for loss in doing business with
Amazon.com.
There is a significant risk in doing business with Amazon.com.
My credit card information may not be secure with Amazon.com.
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APPENDIX C. TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF SAMPLE GROUPS
The sample was split into two groups in two different ways to check for homogeneity of the
sample between "yes-click" and "no-click" groups. The splits were set based on each
participant's ratio of yes to no clicks compared to the means for the yes/no click ratio for the
sample. The first grouping was performed based on the ratio of security warning disregard
before the security incident, and the second grouping was done on the ratio of security warning
disregard after the security incident. All of the demographic and control variables were
compared in each analysis.
First, the data were grouped based on their relation to the mean of security warning disregard
before

the security incident

for

the sample

(𝑀 = .749, 𝑆𝐷 = .388, 𝑁𝐺1 = 19, 𝑁𝐺2 = 43).

Comparisons of control and survey research variables between the two groups are described
below in Table C-1. No statistically significant differences between the two groups were found.
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Table C-1. Comparison of Yes-click and No-click Groups Before the Security Incident
Variable

Group 1 M (SD)

Group 2 M (SD)

p

Effect Size
(Cohen's d)

Age1
Income Risk
Sensitivity (scale of
1–4)1
Perceived Security
Risk of Malware—
Pre-test1
Threat Severity of
Malware—Pre-test1
Threat
Susceptibility of
Malware—Pre-test1
General Risk
Appetite—Pre-test3
Perceived Security
Risk of Malware—
Post-test3
Threat Severity of
Malware—Posttest1
Threat
Susceptibility of
Malware - Posttest3

21.53 (2.038)
2.74 (1.327)

21.98 (1.933)
2.60 (1.137)

.529
.607

0.229
0.117

15.11 (3.160)

13.86 (4.302)

.581

0.313

10.83 (4.076)

11.79 (5.365)

.656

0.191

9.22 (3.370)

9.33 (4.492)

.759

0.026

27.72 (4.496)

27.49 (6.017)

.883

0.041

15.22 (3.797)

14.63 (4.254)

.709

0.138

14.33 (3.985)

15.02 (4.662)

.266

0.154

12.78 (4.066)

12.28 (4.506)

.704

0.114

Group 1
Proportions

Group 2
Proportions

p2

Effect Size (ϕ)

Variable

Gender
Male (68.4%)
Male (76.7%)
.538
.088
Left-handed
Yes (10.5%)
Yes (11.6%)
1.000
.016
Native English
Yes (94.7%)
Yes (86.0%)
.422
.127
Speaker
Normal Vision
Yes (89.5%)
Yes (97.7%)
.220
.176
EEG Experience
No (94.7%)
No (88.4%)
.657
.099
Mental Condition
No (100%)
No (93.0%)
.546
.150
Colorblind
No (94.7%)
No (93.0%)
1.000
.032
1
– Due to a violation of the assumption of normality, this p-value was obtained using the MannWhitney U test. Cohen's d is included for ease of approximate interpretation of the effect size.
2
– p values taken from Fisher exact test.
3
– p values taken from t-test.

Next, the data were grouped based on their relation to the mean of security warning disregard
after

the

security

incident

for

the

sample

(𝑀 = .673, 𝑆𝐷 = .433, 𝑁𝐺1 = 22, 𝑁𝐺2 = 40).

Comparisons between the two groups’ control and survey research variables are included below
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in Table C-2. The only significant differences found were between the group proportions for
native and non-native English speakers and in the comparison of group means for measures of
threat susceptibility taken post-test. This difference was also detected during the main data
analysis for the hypotheses and was included as a control variable in H4's regression analyses.
Likewise, survey measures of threat susceptibility to malware taken post-test were found to
significantly predict security warning disregard (see Table 5, H4c). Therefore, it is not surprising
to see a significant difference between groups in post-test threat susceptibility given that the
groups were decided based on participants’ security warning disregard ratios, making this
examination, in a way, tautological.
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Table C-2. Comparison of Yes-click and No-click Groups after the Security Incident
Variable

Age1
Income Risk
Sensitivity (scale of 1–
4)1
Perceived Security
Risk of Malware—Pretest3
Threat Severity of
Malware—Pre-test1
Threat Susceptibility of
Malware—Pre-test1
General Risk
Appetite—Pre-test3
Perceived Security
Risk of Malware—
Post-test1
Threat Severity of
Malware—Post-test1
Threat Susceptibility of
Malware—Post-test1
Variable

Gender
Left-handed
Native English
Speaker
Normal Vision
EEG Experience
Mental Condition
Colorblind

Group 1 M
(SD)

Group 2 M (SD)

p

Effect Size
(Cohen's d)

21.50 (1.99)
2.68 (1.21)

22.03 (1.94)
2.63 (1.19)

.401
.843

0.229
0.117

15.71 (2.795)

13.45 (4.356)

.148

0.582

11.95 (4.213)

11.28 (5.411)

.502

0.133

9.67 (3.679)

9.10 (4.431)

.408

0.136

28.48 (4.936)

27.08 (5.885)

.355

0.251

15.95 (3.232)

14.20 (4.410)

.148

0.433

15.57 (3.572)

14.43 (4.846)

.668

0.257

14.19 (4.045)

11.50 (4.267)

.017*

0.642

Group 1
Proportions

Group 2
Proportions

p2

Effect Size (ϕ)

Male (63.6%)
No (90.9%)
Yes (100%)

Male (80.0%)
No (87.5%)
Yes (82.5%)

.226
1.000
.044*

.179
.052
.265

Yes (95.5%)
No (95.5%)
No (100%)
No (90.9%)

Yes (95.0%)
No (87.5%)
No (92.5%)
No (95.5%)

1.000
.409
.546
.610

.010
.129
.167
.080

– Due to a violation of the assumption of normality, this p-value was obtained using the Mann-Whitney U
test. Cohen's d is included for ease of approximate interpretation of the effect size.
2 – p values taken from Fisher exact test.
3
– p values taken from t-test.
* significant at 𝛼 < .05.
1
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APPENDIX D. TESTS FOR MEDIATING AND MODERATING EFFECTS
To better understand how the IGT behavioral data relates to the P300 and security warning
disregard, we conducted an exploratory analysis of mediation (i.e., the behavioral data
intervenes between the P300 amplitude and security warning disregard), as well as moderation
(i.e., the behavioral data interacts with the P300 amplitude in influencing security warning
disregard). In doing so, we used the ratio of choices from the most risky deck (Deck B) to
choices from the safest deck (Deck C) for each participant during the IGT as our behavioral
measure of performance.
First, we tested whether the behavioral IGT data mediated the effect of P300 on security
warning disregard (see Figure D1 below).

P300

Behavioral
IGT Data

Security
Warning
Disregard

Figure D1. Mediating Effect of Behavioral IGT Data
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), in order for mediation to occur, one must first
demonstrate that the independent variable (P300) significantly predicts the mediating variable
(behavioral IGT data), and that the mediating variable significantly predicts the dependent
variable (security warning disregard). We tested these relationships utilizing regression, as
presented in Table D1 and D2 below:
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Table D1. Behavioral IGT Data Regressed on the P300
Difference Score
Model
Intercept
P300 Difference
Score

ß
1.094

Std. Error
.105

Standardized ß
—

t
10.378***

-.007

.025

-.037

.782 ns

R2

Model statistics:
= .001; F = .078, ns
*** p < .001; ns = not significant

Table D2. Security Warning Disregard (Before Security Incident)
Regressed on Behavioral IGT Data
Model
Intercept
Behavioral IGT Data

ß
.624
.096

Std. Error
.090
.067

Standardized ß
—
.184

t
6.971***
1.427 ns

Model statistics: R2 = .034; F = 2.037, ns
*** p < .001; ns = not significant

The results depicted in the above tables show that the P300 difference score did not predict the
behavioral IGT data, nor did the behavioral IGT data predict security warning disregard (before
the security incident)6. We therefore conclude that the behavioral data from the IGT did not
mediate the effect of the P300 on security warning disregard in the image classification task.
Additionally, we tested whether the behavioral IGT data moderated the effect of P300 on
security warning disregard (see Figure D2 below).

Behavioral
IGT Data

P300

Security
Warning
Disregard

Figure D2. Moderating Effect of Behavioral IGT Data

6

We obtained similar results when using security warning disregard (after security incident) as the
dependent variable.
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According to Carte and Russell (2003), in order for moderation to occur, one must first
demonstrate that the product of the independent variable (P300) and the moderating variable
(behavioral IGT data) significantly predicts the dependent variable (security warning disregard).
We tested these relationships using hierarchical regression, with the interaction term in the
second block. This allowed us to show the effect of the interaction over and above its individual
components. These results are presented in Table D3 below:
Table D3. Security Warning Disregard (Before Security Incident)
Regressed on the Interaction of Behavioral IGT Data and P300
Difference Score
Model 1
ß
Std. Error
Intercept
.664
.089
P300 Difference Score -.028
.013
Behavioral IGT Data
.091
.065
2
Model statistics: R = .108; F = 3.446*
Model 2
ß
Std. Error
Intercept
.663
.089
P300 Difference Score -.035
.020
Behavioral IGT Data
.092
.066
Behavioral IGT Data X
P300 Difference Score
.008
.015
2
Model statistics: R = .112; F = 2.349 ns
ΔR2 = .004; F for ΔR2 = .246 ns
*** p < .001; * p < .05; ns = not significant

Standardized ß
—
-.272
.174

t

Standardized ß
—
-.348
.176

t
7.421***
-1.760 ns
1.399 ns

.098

.496 ns

7.485***
-2.174*
1.392 ns

Because the interaction term was not significant, and because R2 did not significantly increase
when the interaction term was added to the model, we conclude that the behavioral IGT data did
not moderate the effect of the P300 on security warning disregard (before security incident)7.
Considering the above results, we conclude that the behavioral data in the IGT had no influence
(either as a mediator or moderator) on the effect of the P300 difference score on security
warning disregard in the image classification task. This is an example of overt behavior not
being as good a predictor as neurophysiological measures (Kirwan, Shrager, & Squire, 2009).

7

Again, the results were similar for using security warning disregard (after security incident) as the
dependent variable.
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APPENDIX E. IGT DECK SELECTIONS
Table E1. Participant IGT Deck Selections by Block of the Experiment
Deck A

Deck B

Deck C

Deck D

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Block 1

19.2

6.5

10

37

30.5

7.4

9

40

20.2

8.1

4

40

30.1

8.6

14

40

Block 2

18.0

6.8

0

39

25.1

8.6

7

40

25.4

9.4

7

40

31.4

7.2

14

40

Block 3

17.7

8.4

4

40

19.7

10.4

3

40

30.2

10.5

6

40

32.4

8.8

11

40

Block 4

17.4

8.8

5

40

19.4

11.3

2

40

29.0

10.4

0

40

33.0

8.9

11

40

Total

72.4

23.2

32

129

94.7

29.9

53

160

104.9

29.1

38

160

126.9

24.5

65

160
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APPENDIX F. EXPLANATION OF THE 600-800MS TIME WINDOW
Most of the literature examining the P300 focuses on the time window 300-600ms following
stimulus onset (San Martín et al., 2013), and we analyzed our data accordingly. Inspection of
Figure 4 reveals a deflection from the baseline for the difference curve at the later 600-800ms
time window. However, this appears to be largely due to the increased noise introduced by
taking the average ERP waveform from a subset of randomly sampled trials. Inspection of an
analysis that included all trials does not reveal this extreme deflection from 0 at the Pz electrode
(see Figure F1A). To facilitate comparison, Figure 4 is reproduced below as Figure F1B. We
therefore conclude that the deflection from the baseline observed in Figure 4 is an artifact of
noise in the resampling process, and not due to participants’ actual neural activity.
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Figure F1. Mean amplitudes when including all trials (A) and a randomly sampled
subset of trials (B) PZ electrode. Note that panel B is the same as Figure 4 from the
manuscript.
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